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NOTE:  This is not an ordinary law review article.  It is a reportsubmitted at the 16th International Congress of Comparative Law,held in Brisbane, Australia, on July 14-20, 2002. The reportaddresses a number of subjects identified by Dr. Anne Fitzgerald,the General Reporter for the section on Electronic Commerce.  Thegeneral purpose of the report is merely to summarize the currentstate of the law in the United States.
REGULATING ELECTRONIC COMMERCE Gregory E. Maggs* I. Introduction The term ‘electronic commerce’ generally refers to contracts andpayments made using computers and other electronic equipment.1  Ascommonly used, the phrase encompasses agreements concluded through theexchange of email, purchases made at internet websites, transfers of moneymade by electronic means, and other similar activities. The term furtherincludes both business-to-business and business-to-consumer transactions.What law governs electronic commerce?  Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.,the great American jurist and legal scholar, once told a humerous tale abouta justice of the peace who heard a lawsuit over a broken butter churn. 2 Helooked up ‘butter churn’ in the index of his law books, but found nothing.Accordingly, the justice of the peace concluded there was no law on point.A modern jurist almost could make the same mistake by looking up‘electronic commerce’ in modern statutes and cases. As this article willshow, a few new laws in the United States establish special rules forelectronic transactions. But that does not mean that other laws do not apply.
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3 See U .C.C. § 2-102 (scope of article 2). 4 See id . § 2-105 (defining goods). 5 See id . 6 See id . § 2-104(3). 7 15 U .S.C §  1644 (limiting liability for unauthorized use of credit cards); id. §1666i (affording cardholders the right to assert against the card issuer certain claimsand defenses arising out of the  transaction). 8 See id . §§ 1644 , 1666i. 
Instead, many general rules of contract and commercial law governelectronic commerce. For example, suppose that a consumer purchases a book over theinternet.  The consumer visits the seller’s website, browses through thetitles for sale, selects a book by clicking on some part of the computerscreen, and then inputs a credit card number.  If all goes as planned, theseller will ship the book, and charge the consumer’s credit card.  The issuerof the credit card, most likely through an intermediary*666 bank, will paythe seller, and then bill the consumer. At the end of the month, theconsumer will pay the credit card. Although this transaction occurred online, the transaction is a contractfor the sale of goods governed by article 2 of the Uniform CommercialCode. 3  The book is a good because it is a ‘movable thing,’4 and thetransaction involves a sale because title to the book passes from the sellerto the buyer for a price.5 The consumer formed a contract by clicking on thecomputer screen because the U.C.C. says that a contract can formed by anymethod sufficient to show an agreement.6  In addition, in making thepurchase, the buyer would have the usual statutory protection afforded tocredit cardholders.7  The federal laws limiting liability for unauthorizedcharges and allowing cardholders to assert claims and defenses against theissuer contain no exception for internet charges.8 Examples like this one show that much of the law of electroniccommerce in the United States is ordinary commercial law.  In addressingdisputes arising out of electronic transactions, courts often simply mustdecide how these ordinary laws apply.  Only in special circumstances mustthey consider new laws applicable only to computer-based transactions. This report will address five current topics concerning electroniccommerce in the United States.  Part II begins by discussing constitutionalpower to regulate internet commerce.  Part III then looks at court decisionsand new statutes concerning the formation of electronic contracts.  Part IVcovers electronic commerce payments.  Part V describes laws governing
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9 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. 10 See G ibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 W heat.) 1 , 193-98 (1824). 11 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118-119 (1941); Wickard v.Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-128 (1942); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,379 U.S. 241, 257-258 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 298 (1964);United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-560 (1995). 
internet crime and website security.  Part VI then talks about the ‘digitaldivide’ separating Americans who have access to internet commerce fromthose who do not. Part VII states a brief conclusion. Discussions of electronic commerce law often address legal issuesrelating to intellectual property and internet governance.  This report,however, will not touch upon either of these important subjects becausethey are covered in conference topic III.B. (‘Copyright Issues and theInformation Highways, and Domain Names on the Internet’). Similarly, thisreport will not consider questions relating to the regulation of on-linecontent and privacy because they are covered by conference topic IV.B.2(‘Protection of Fundamental Rights in the Digital Era’). *667 II. Constitutional Power to Regulate Electronic Commerce The United States Constitution limits governmental power and dividesit between the federal government and the fifty states.  Accordingly, asCongress and state legislatures seek to enact new laws regulating electroniccommerce, questions inevitably arise about what the Constitution does anddoes not permit.  Although only a few cases specifically have addressedthese questions, the answers most likely will turn on the application ofseveral well-established constitutional principles. A. Federal Power The ‘Commerce Clause’ of the Constitution empowers Congress to‘regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.’9  The Supreme Courthas held that this power enables Congress to regulate interstate commerceand its channels and instrumentalities.10  It further has held that the powerpermits Congress to regulate intrastate economic activities, provided thatCongress rationally could conclude that the activities might have asubstantial effect on interstate commerce, either by themselves or throughtheir repetition nationwide. 11Using this power, Congress presumably could regulate most aspects ofelectronic commerce.  Not only does much of this commerce cross statelines, but even commerce located wholly within one state may affect
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12 See, e.g., American Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 , 169-184(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (ho lding that interstate communications on the internet fall withinthe meaning of ‘commerce’). 13 15 U .S.C. §§ 7000-7013 . 14 See infra part III.a. 15 Seeinfra part V. 16 SeeG ibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 W heat.) at 237. 17 SeeU .S. Const. amend. 10. 18 See U .S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 19 See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984). 20 See id . 21 SeeInternet Tax Freedom Act § 1101, Pub. L. 105-277, Div. C, T itle XI, Oct.21, 1998, 112 Stat. 2681-719 (not codified, but included as note at 47 U .S.C. §151). 22 See U .S. Const. art I, § 8 , cl. 3. 23 See South Carolina Department of Transportation v. Barnwell Brothers, 303U.S. 177, 189 (1938); Southern Pacific v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945). 
interstate commerce. 12  Indeed, pursuant to this power, Congress alreadyhas passed various laws. A prominent example is the Electronic Signaturesin Global and National Commerce Act of 2000 (ESIGN). 13 As discussedmore fully below, this act validates contracts formed by electronic means.14Congress also has used its commerce power to pass laws aimed at computercrime.15 B. State Power The Commerce Clause does not give Congress the exclusive power toregulate commerce.16  Rather, the states share that power as part of theirreserved sovereignty.17  When a state seeks to regulate*668 commercewithin its borders, it faces only a few important limitations. First, under the Supremacy Clause,18  federal legislation may preemptstate regulation. A federal statute preempts or supercedes a state statutewhenever the two conflict.19  In addition, federal legislation will preempta state law whenever Congress indicates that the federal legislation shouldoccupy the field to the exclusion of state law.20  For example, in the InternetTax Freedom Act of 1998, Congress preempted new state and local lawsthat would tax internet access or discriminate against electroniccommerce.21 Second, as an implication of the Commerce Clause,22  a state law cannotimpose a burden on interstate commerce that is excessive in relation tolegitimate local interests.23  Under this test, a federal court invalidated aNew York law that restricted the distribution of obscene materials to
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24 SeeAmerican Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F . Supp. at 173. 25 See id . at 175-76. 26 See U .S. Const. art. I, § 8 , cl. 3. 27 See Dean Milk v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951); Hughes v.Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979). 28 SeeU .S. Const. amends. 5 , 14. 29 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 30 568  N.W .2d 715 (Minn. 1997). 
minors over the internet. 24 The court found the law excessively burden-some because it would regulate websites located in other states that mighthave different legal standards.25 Third, as another implication of the Commerce Clause,26  a state lawcannot treat interstate commerce differently from intrastate commerce, andcannot have a disparate impact on interstate commerce, when there is areasonable, non-discriminatory, alternative way of furthering the state’slegitimate interests.27  No reported case has addressed this kind ofdiscrimination in the context of electronic commerce. As a hypotheticalexample, however, a state could not prohibit an out-of-state corporationfrom providing internet access in the state. Even if the limitations of the Supremacy Clause and Dormant Com-merce Clause do not invalidate a state law, the requirement of Due Processmay limit judicial application of the law outside of the state boundaries. 28For example, suppose that an internet user in New York wants to press aclaim under a New York law against a California business arising out of thebusiness’s website in California. Due process may pose obstacles for theinternet user, whether the internet users sue the business in New York orCalifornia. *669 If the internet user sues the California business in New York, thebusiness may argue that Due Process prevents a New York court fromasserting jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Due ProcessClause to prohibit a court from exercising jurisdiction over any person orbusiness that does not have ‘minimum contacts’ with the state in which thecourt is located.29  A number of American cases have considered whethermaintaining a website accessible by users located in another state sufficesto create minimum contacts with the state, but they do not all agree. Some courts have held that they may exercise jurisdiction consistentwith due process because a website and other factors may create minimumcontacts.  For example, in Minnesota v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc.,30 thestate of Minnesota sued the owner of a gambling business located in
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31 See id .at 718. 32 See id . 33 See id . at 719-20. 34 See, e .g., Euromarket Designs, Inc. v. Crate & Barrel Ltd., 96 F . Supp. 2d824, 841 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952F. Supp. 1119, 1124  (W.D. Pa. 1997). 35 Ty, Inc. v. Clark, 2000 W L 51816 (N.D . Ill.). 36 See id . at *3. 37 See, e .g., Soma M edical International v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d1292, 1297 (10th Cir. 1999); America Online, Inc. v. Huang, 106 F. Supp.2d 848,855 (E.D. Va. 2000); Stewart v. Vista Point Verlag & Ringier Publishing, 2000 WL1459839, *4 (S .D.N.Y.). 38 See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16(1984) (indicating that a court to may exercise personal jurisdiction over adefendant whenever the defendant has engaged in ‘systematic and continuous’activities in the  forum state). 39 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981). 
Nevada for consumer fraud. The court ruled that the business had minimumcontacts with the state of Minnesota sufficient for the exercise of jurisdic-tion based largely on the ability of Minnesota internet users to see thegambling business’s website. 31 The court rejected the business’s argumentthat minimum contacts did not exist because its maintenance of the websitewas ‘passive’ and Minnesota citizens had chosen to visit the website.32  Thecourt likened websites to broadcast and direct mail solicitation, both ofwhich have sufficed to establish minimum contacts in non-electroniccommerce cases.33  Other cases also have found jurisdiction on similarfacts.34 A few courts have reached a somewhat contrary conclusion.  In Ty Inc.v. Clark,35  a federal court located in Illinois refused to exercise jurisdictionover a company in the United Kingdom. The court emphasized that,although the company in the United Kingdom maintained a website thatinternet users could access while using computers in Illinois, the companydid not engage in online transactions.36  Other courts also have refused toexercise jurisdiction using similar reasoning.37 If the New York internet user sues the business in California, aCalifornia court could exercise jurisdiction because of the business’s *670location in the state.38  Due Process, however, may preclude the Californiacourt from applying New York law. The United States Supreme Court hasheld that a state ‘must have a significant contact or significant aggregationof contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neitherarbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.’39  Most states’ choice of law rules
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40 For general discussion of these topics, see Radin, “Humans, Computers, andBinding Commitment,” 75 Ind. L.J. 1125 (2000); Note, Goodman, “Honey, IShrink-wrapped The Consumer: The Shrink-wrap Agreement as an AdhesionContract,” 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 319 (1999). 41 Judge Frank Easterbrook has explained the origins of the term ‘shrinkwrap’as follows: ‘The ‘shrinkwrap license’ gets its name from the fact that retail softwarepackages are covered  in plastic or cellophane ‘shrinkwrap,’ and some vendors ...have written licenses that become effective as soon as the customer tears thewrapping from the package.’ ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449  (7thCir. 1996). 
satisfy this standard. Accordingly, at least to date, no reported caseinvolving electronic commerce has questioned whether a court’s choice oflaw violated due process. III. Formation of Electronic Contracts Most electronic commerce, like most commerce generally, involves thecreation of contracts.  Perhaps for this reason, many of the most significantdevelopments in the law governing electronic commerce have concernedcontract formation.  The following discussion addresses four of the mostimportant issues in this area. A. Assent to Contractual Terms A controversial electronic commerce issue arises when a businesswishes to sell or distribute goods or services to an internet user, but onlysubject to certain conditions or limitations.  The issue is how to bind theinternet user to contractual terms specifying the conditions and limitations.For example, a distributor of software may wish to require the user tomediate any disputes that arise. What must the vendor do to obtain theuser’s assent to a term requiring mediation? Vendors engaged in electronic commerce have attempted threesomewhat controversial methods of obtaining the assent of internet users.These methods go by the names of ‘shrink wrap,’ ‘click wrap,’ and‘browser wrap.’ 40 They all use different ways of presenting the contractterms to the internet user. The ‘shrink wrap’ method involves putting a message on a producttelling the purchaser that any use of the product constitutes assent tospecified terms.41  The two leading cases on shrink wrap both come fromthe United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.*671   In bothcases, the court upheld the use of shrink wrap as a means of binding apurchaser to contractual terms. 
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42 See id . at 1149. 43 See id . at 1450. 44 See id . 45 See id . 46 See id .at 1451. 47 See id. at 1452 (noting that the vendor, as master of the bargain, was free toset the terms of acceptance). 48 Id. at 1453 . 49 105  F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997). 50 See id . at 1148. 51 See id . 52 See id . 53 See id . 54 See id . at 1148-49. 
In ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, a vendor sold a CD containing a telephonedirectory and software that allowed the user to access the directory data. 42The box containing the CD indicated that the software came with userestrictions stated in an enclosed license.43  The enclosed manual containedthe license.44  In addition, the license appeared on the screen when theconsumer used the software, and the software would not allow the user toproceed without indicating assent.45  In an often-cited opinion by JudgeFrank Easterbrook, the court held that the consumer was bound by theterms of the license, even though the consumer had not seen the terms atthe time of paying for the product.46  The court explained that, although thebuyer had paid the purchase price, he had not completed acceptance of acontract until indicating assent to the license. 47 The inability of the buyerto see the terms of the license before paying (although not before accept-ing) did not trouble the court because consumers often cannot examine thecontents of purchases in advance. The court explained: ‘Terms of use areno less a part of the ‘the product’ than are the size of the database and thespeed with which the software compiles listings. Competition amongvendors, not judicial revision of the package’s contents, is how consumersare protected in a market economy.’48 In Hill v. Gateway 2000,49  consumers purchased a computer over thetelephone.50  When the computer arrived, the box contained an elaborateform contract.51  The terms of the contract required arbitration of allcontract disputes but provided that the purchaser could return the computerwithin thirty days of the purchase.52  The consumers later attempted to suethe manufacturer in court.53  In another opinion by Judge Easterbrook, thecourt followed Pro-CD, and held that the consumers could not maintaintheir lawsuit because they were bound by the arbitration clause.54  The
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55 See id . at 1150. 56 If the buyer decides not to agree to the sale, the buyer should have a right toreturn of the purchase price, presumably under a theory of restitution. 57 The seller, for example, might tell prospective purchasers the goods come‘subject to contractual limitations stated with the product.’ 58 104  F. Supp. 2d  1332 (D. Kan. 2000). 59 See id . at 1339. 60 See id . at 1340. 61 Id. at 1340 . 62 See id . 
court explained that the consumers knew before ordering the computer thatit would *672 come with a contract containing some important terms, butthey did not ask to see them.55 To summarize, under these two cases, a seller can bind a buyer to shrinkwrap terms in two situations.  First, the seller may structure the transactionso that a sale is not complete until a buyer agrees to contractual terms sentwith a product, whether or not the buyer paid in advance.56  Second, theseller may structure the transaction so that at the time the sale becomescomplete the buyer at least knows that the product comes subject to somecontractual terms, even if the buyer does not know exactly what those termssay.57  These rules simplify the process of selling products subject to uselimitations. At least one court, however, has disagreed with Hill v. Gateway 2000and ProCD v. Zeidenberg.  In Klocek v. Gateway, Inc.,58  a federal districtcourt refused to enforce shrink-wrap terms requiring arbitration. 59 Thecourt held that the consumer had offered to purchase the computer, and themanufacturer had accepted the offer by shipping the merchandise.60Although the manufacturer had included terms in the box with thecomputer, the manufacturer ‘did not communicate to plaintiff anyunwillingness to proceed without plaintiff’s agreement to the [licenseterms.]’61  Accordingly, the court said, the terms could not become part ofthe contract unless the purchaser agreed to them, which the purchaser didnot.62  Whether other courts also will reject the Seventh Circuit’s analysisremains uncertain. Another method of obtaining assent for sales over the internet is ‘clickwrap.’ After selecting a product to purchase, the internet user sees thecontract terms on the computer screen, and cannot complete the purchase
REGULATING ELECTRONIC COMMERCE10
63 Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 150 F. Supp.2d 585, 593-94(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (‘A click-wrap license presents the user with a message on his orher computer screen, requiring that the user manifest his or her assent to the termsof the license agreement by clicking on an icon. The product cannot be obtained orused unless and until the icon is c licked.’). 64 2000 W L 631341, *4 (N .D. Ill.). 65 1998 W L 388389, *6 (N .D. Cal.). 66 In Groff v. America Online, 1998 WL 307001, *5 (R .I. Super.), a court alsoupheld assent based on website that required the user to click on ‘I agree’ or ‘Idisagree.’ 67 See Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 2000 WL 33266437, *6 (E.D.Cal. 2000)(using the  term ‘browser wrap). 68 150  F. Supp.2d  585  (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 69 See id . at 595-96. 70 Id. at 595. 
without clicking a box on the screen to indicate assent.63  A few courts haveupheld the use of click wrap. For example, in In re RealNetworks, Inc.Privacy Litigation,64  the court held that internet users had agreed to alicense agreement requiring arbitration. Similarly, in Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc.,65  a court *673 upheld the validity of restrictions on theuse of free email accounts for sending advertisements. 66Although the opinions in RealNetworks and Hotmail do not containdetailed legal analysis, most courts probably will consider click wrap to beless controversial than shrink wrap.  With click wrap, unlike shrink wrap,the purchaser sees the terms of the contract, and indicates assent, beforeparting with any money.  This feature greatly diminishes the possibility ofdisappointed expectations. A final method of presenting contractual terms to a consumer is‘browser wrap.’67  When using this method, an internet vendor affords theuser the opportunity to look at the terms of the sale, but does not require theuser to click on anything to indicate assent to these terms before paying forthe product. For example, the website may contain a button saying “clickhere for legal terms,” which the purchaser may click or ignore. One court has held that browser wrap does not suffice to obtain assent.In Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp.,68  the court decided that acomputer user who downloaded software did not assent to a licenseagreement.69  The website contained a message saying ‘Please review andagree to the terms of the Netscape Smart Download software licenseagreement before downloading and using the software.’70 The user,
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71 The court said: ‘Couched in the mild  request, ‘Please review,’ this languagereads as a mere invitation, not as a condition. The language does not indicate thata user must agree to the license terms before downloading and using the software.’Id. at *596. 72 2000 W L 33266437  (E.D. Cal.). 73 See id . at *5. 74 See id . 75 See id . at 6. 76 Id. 77 See M aggs, “Internet Solutions to Consumer Protection Problems,” 49 S.C.L. Rev. 887, 894-96 (1998) (discussing how the Gateway 2000 could have made theterms of its computer sales contracts available online, as most computer vendorsdo). 78 Black’s Law Dictionary 661-62 (6th ed. 1990). 
however, was not required to review the terms of the agreement. The courtheld that this scheme did not suffice to create a contract.71 Another court appears to have disagreed.  In Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd.,72a website contained information about the scheduling of music concerts.The website also stated terms restricting copying the information.73Although users could see the license, they did not have to click on anythingin order to see the concert information.74  When the proprietor of thewebsite sued a user for breaching the license, the user sought to dismiss ongrounds that the user had not assented to it.75  The court, however, refusedto dismiss the case, *674 concluding that the browser wrap ‘agreement maybe arguably valid and enforceable.’ 76Vendors might combine browser wrap with shrink wrap.  They mightmake the terms of contracts available for viewing online, but ship theproducts subject to later assent by the purchaser.  This approach mayeliminate some of the objections to shrink wrap and browser wrap thatcurrently exist.77  Not only would purchasers know that they will have toaccept contractual terms to complete the purchase, they also will have anopportunity to see the terms in advance. Adding click wrap would furtherensure that purchasers have the opportunity to assent to contractual terms.B. Statute of Frauds A ‘statute of frauds’ is a statute making certain kinds of contractsunenforceable absent a signed writing. 78 The federal government and thefifty states have enacted numerous statutes of frauds. The UniformCommercial Code, for example, requires a signed writing for contracts for
REGULATING ELECTRONIC COMMERCE12
79 See U .C.C. § 2-201(1). 80 9 U.S.C. §  2. 81 The National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform States Laws draftedand published U ETA. For information and state adoption statistics. See<<http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ueta99.htm>> (visited Sept. 25,2001). For the full text of UETA, see <<http:// www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ueta99.htm>> (visited  Sept. 25, 2001). 82 15 U .S.C. §§ 7000-7013 . 83 No reported cases had addressed either ESIGN or UETA as of September2001. 84 See U ETA § 7 . 
the sale of goods for $500 or more. 79 The Federal Arbitration Act,similarly, requires a writing for contracts to arbitrate disputes.80 The requirement of a writing and a signature under a statute of fraudspotentially could pose an obstacle to internet commerce.  For example,suppose that two parties attempt to form a contract by email for the sale ofgoods for a price of more than $500.  Do their electronically exchangedmessages satisfy the ‘writing’ requirement of Uniform Commercial Code?Can they ‘sign’ their writing electronically? Two significant pieces of legislation address these questions.  One is theUniform Electronic Transaction Act of 1999 (UETA), a model state lawenacted 37 states.81  The other is the federal Electronic Signatures in Globaland National Commerce Act of 2000 (ESIGN).82  Both of these statuteshave the effect of creating exceptions *675 to statutes of frauds so that theydo not automatically prevent enforcement of electronic contracts.83 UETA, the state legislation, strives to eliminate obstacles that statutesof fraud might impose by stating four basic principles: (a) A record or signature may not be denied legal effect or enforce-ability solely because it is in electronic form.(b) A contract may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solelybecause an electronic record was used in its formation. (c) If a law requires a record to be in writing, an electronic recordsatisfies the law. (d) If a law requires a signature, an electronic signature satisfies thelaw.84
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85 UETA defines a record as ‘information that is inscribed on a tangible mediumor that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is re trievable in perceivableform.’ Id. § 2(13). It defines an electronic record as ‘a record created, generated,sent, communicated, received, or stored by electronic means.’ Id. §  2(7). 86 15 U .S.C. §  7001(1)(a). 87 See UETA § 3 (defining the scope of the statute); ESIGN, 15 U.S.C. § 7003(identifying exceptions). 88 See U ETA § 3(b)(1); ESIGN , 15 U .S.C. §  7003(a)(1). 89 See U ETA § 3(b)(2); ESIGN  § 7003(a)(3). 90 See Patricia Brumfield Fry, “A Preliminary Analysis of Federal and StateElectronic Commerce Laws,” <<http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact_articles/uniformacts-article-ueta.asp>> (visited Sept. 17, 2001) (providing anin-depth analysis of the ESIGN ’s preemptive effects). 91 See ESIGN, 15 U.S.C. §  7002(a)(1). 92 See Fry, supra  n. 90 (discussing these differences). 93 See, e.g., Van Brunt v. Jackson, 512 P.2d 517, 520  (1973) (requiring theplaintiff to prove that the defendant executed the contract). 
Pursuant to these principles, electronic records and signatures may takethe place of traditional paper and ink.85 ESIGN, the federal legislation, serves a similar function.  ESIGNprovides that, notwithstanding any previously existing statute of frauds, ‘asignature, contract, or other record relating to such transaction may not bedenied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is inelectronic form. ‘86  It thus also allows electronic commerce to take placewithout hindrance from statutes of frauds. Both UETA and ESIGN contain various exceptions.87  For example,neither law applies to writing requirements for wills, codicils, or testamen-tary trusts.88  In addition, both laws exclude almost all of the UniformCommercial Code except for the articles dealing with contracts for the saleand lease of goods.89 Although ESIGN is a federal statute, it does not preempt UETA.90  Onthe contrary, ESIGN specifically provides that, if a state has enactedUETA, then UETA rather ESIGN will govern exceptions to state statutesof frauds.91  Although the similarity of the statutes *676 generally makesit irrelevant which law applies, a number of subtle difference do exist.92 C. Attribution of Electronic Records When a plaintiff sues a defendant for breach of contract, the plaintiffmust show more than the existence of a promise.  The plaintiff also mustshow that the defendant, or the defendant’s agent, made the promise.93
REGULATING ELECTRONIC COMMERCE14
94 At least for some classes of contracts, a signature in the name of the defendantis prima facie evidence that the defendant agreed to the contract. See, e.g., U.C.C.§ 3-308 (presumption of validity of signatures on negotiable instruments). 95 UETA § 9(a). 96 Id. § 9  cmt. 1. 97 See id . 98 See Julia Angwin, “Credit-Card Scams Bedevil E-Stores: With No Signaturesto Prove Who Placed Orders, Sites Are Left Footing the Bills,” Wall St. J., Sept. 19,2000, at B1 (explaining how credit card issuers charge back allegedly fraudulentcharges to internet business more frequently than other businesses). 
When litigating non-electronic commerce transactions, the plaintiff oftenuses documentary evidence to address this issue of attribution. Forexample, the plaintiff may introduce a document purportedly signed by thedefendant or the defendant’s agent.94 In litigating electronic commerce transactions, however, the plaintiffgenerally has no paper and ink documents to use for attributing a promiseto a defendant.  Instead, the plaintiff may have evidence only that someonevisited the plaintiff’s website, and typed the defendant’s name or emailaddress when promising to pay for a purchase.  The question arises whetherthis type of evidence can suffice to attribute the promise to the defendant.UETA addresses this issue of attribution with the following provision:An electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to aperson if it was the act of the person.  The act of the person may beshown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of anysecurity procedure applied to determine the person to which theelectronic record or electronic signature was attributable.95Although no cases have yet addressed this provision, the UETAcommentary confirms that an electronic record and electronic signaturewould be attributable to a person if the ‘person types his/her name as partof an e-mail purchase order.’96  The commentary also makes clear that theplaintiff would have to overcome any evidence presented by the defendantof fraud or forgery.97  In reality, many businesses still may wish that theyhad the customer’s signature in ink on paper, notwithstanding UETA,because a genuine signature would simplify proof.98 *677 D. Automated Transactions (Electronic Agents) Using machines to make contracts predates the invention of computers.Businesses, after all, have made sales through vending machines fordecades.  Yet, in most non-electronic commerce transactions of substantial
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99 UET A § 14(1). UETA further states: ‘(2) A contract may be formed by theinteraction of an electronic agent and an individual, acting on the individual’s ownbehalf or for another person, including by an interaction in which the individualperforms actions that the individual is free to refuse to perform and which theindividual knows or has reason to know will cause the electronic agent to completethe transaction or performance. (3) The terms of the contract are determined by thesubstantive law applicable to it.’ Id. § 14(2)-(3). 100 15 U .S.C. §  7002(h). 101 See U ETA § 14 cmt. 1. 
significance, humans rather than machines participate in the formation ofagreements.  When non-human entities like corporations make purchasesand sales, they generally rely on human agents to form their contracts. In electronic commerce transactions, by contrast, businesses andindividuals may rely on computers to make contracts of considerablesophistication.  For example, when an internet user purchases a camera ata website, the website may process the order entirely without humanintervention.  It make take the credit card number, send an order to thewarehouse, prepare the shipping labels, and so forth.  The question whethera person or business may use an electronic agent to form a contracttherefore becomes more significant. UETA and ESIGN each contain provisions designed to remove anydoubt that electronic agents may form contracts.  UETA says: A contract may be formed by the interaction of electronic agents ofthe parties, even if no individual was aware of or reviewed theelectronic agents’ actions or the resulting terms and agreements.99Similarly, ESIGN states: A contract or other record relating to a transaction in or affectinginterstate or foreign commerce may not be denied legal effect,validity, or enforceability solely because its formation, creation, ordelivery involved the action of one or more electronic agents so longas the action of any such electronic agent is legally attributable to theperson to be bound.100These provisions do not purport to change existing law.  Instead, as theUETA commentary asserts, they merely confirm that machines may act asagents. 101  No cases have yet addressed these sections. 
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102 See Matthews, “Credit Cards--Authorized and Unauthorized Use,” 13 Ann.Rev. Banking l. 233, 240-42 (1994) (discussing agreement between cardholder andissuing bank). 103 See, e .g., “AT&T Offers Protection for Net Buys,” Cards International, Feb.27, 1996, at 6 (discussing how AT&T has modified its contracts with cardholdersfor purchases on the internet). 104 See Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1)(B) (limitingliability for unauthorized use of credit cards to $50); Electronic Funds Transfer Act,id. § 1693g(a) (limiting liability for unauthorized use of debit cards connected witha bank account to  $50  in certain circumstances). 
*678 IV. Electronic Commerce PaymentsIn addition to the formation of contracts, most electronic commerceinvolves some sort of payment.  Internet users, for example, need to pay forany goods or services that they purchase at websites.  The followingdiscussion addresses issues relating to electronic transactions involvingcredit and debits cards, negotiable instruments, and other payment devices.A. Credit Cards and Debit Cards Few if any legal obstacles inhibit using credit cards and debit cards inelectronic commerce.  Private contracts rather than legislative enactmentsestablish most of the rights and duties of cardholders, card issuers, andmerchants.102  To the extent that these contracts require modernization toaccommodate electronic commerce, these parties can modify them. Indeed,some changes relating to internet purchases have already taken place.103 Although private agreements generally govern the rights of cardholders,cardholders also enjoy statutory limitations on their liability for theunauthorized use of their credit cards and debit cards.  In particular, section134 of federal Consumer Credit Protection Act and section 909 of thefederal Electronic Fund Transfer Act may limit their liability to $50.104This limitation on liability greatly relieves anxiety that consumersotherwise might have about using their credit and debit cards to makeelectronic purchases. Nothing in these statutes makes them inapplicable toelectronic commerce transactions. A consumer credit cardholder has another federal statutory right aimedat facilitating dispute resolution.  In particular, if the cardholder has a claimor defense against a merchant, section 170 of the Consumer CreditProtection Act gives the cardholder a limited right to assert this claim or
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105 See 15 U.S.C. § 1666i. The card issuer, by contract, may have a right tocharge back of the amount claim or defense to the merchant. See Angwin, supra n.98, at B1. 106 See id . 107 See In re Standard Financial Management Co., 94 B.R. 231, 239 (Bankr. D.Mass 1988); Plutchok v. European American Bank, 540 N.Y.S.2d 135, 137 (Dist.Ct. 1989). 108 See In re Standard Financial Management Co., 540 N.Y.S.2d at 137. 109 See Lucinda Harper, “Americans Won’t Stop W riting Checks-- ElectronicPayments Are Viewed as Too Complicated,” Wall St. J., Nov. 24, 1998, at A2(describing how Americans write  more than 65 billion checks each year). 110 U.C.C. § 3-104(f). 111 Id. § 3-104(e). 112 Id. § 3-103(a)(6). 113 See UETA §  3(b)(2) (excluding article 3 of the U.C.C.); ESIGN, 15 U.S.C.§ 7003(a)(3) (same). 
defense against the card issuer. 105 The consumer can assert this claim ordefense simply by withholding payment to the card issuer, which thecardholder may find more convenient than suing the merchant. *679 Nothing in section 170 prevents the provision from applying toelectronic commerce. Internet purchases, however, do raise one unresolvedissue. By its terms, section 170 applies only to transactions occurringwithin the same state or within 100 miles of the cardholder’s billingaddress.106  If an internet user located on the East Coast visits the websiteof a company located in West Coast, a dispute may arise about where thetransaction took place. In deciding where contracts made over the telephoneare formed for the purpose of section 170, courts traditionally have saidthat formation occurs at the place where the acceptance of the offer isuttered.107  This rather formalistic test requires a careful analysis todetermine which party made the offer and which party made the accep-tance.108  How or even whether courts will apply this test to purchases madeover the internet remains unclear. B. Negotiable Instruments and Documents of Title Americans use ordinary checks to make an extraordinary number ofpayments.109  Under current law, they cannot create these checks electroni-cally. The Uniform Commercial Code defines a check as a form of a‘draft,’110  and a draft as an ‘order.’111  It then specifies that an order is ‘awritten instruction to pay money signed by the person giving the instruc-tion.’112  Neither UETA nor ESIGN create an exception to the writing andsignature requirements.113  The official commentary to UETA explains that
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the check collection system simply involves too many parties and relation-ships to change the present rules.114 Although the U.C.C. requires the creation of a physical check, it permitssome electronic handling of checks.  For example, it permits the electronicpresentment of checks.  In other words, a depositary bank need not actuallysend the check to the payor bank, but instead *680 may transmit just theinformation contained on the check.115  An increasing number of banks areusing this procedure.116 In addition, the U.C.C. does not require banks to return canceled checksto their customers; instead, they can send the customer a statement listingthe check numbers and their amounts.117  Although many state statutesrequire parties to retain cancelled checks for recordkeeping purposes,118UETA and ESIGN both provide that electronic retention of the informationon the front and back of checks will satisfy these requirements.119 Even though UETA and ESIGN do not apply to checks, they validatethe creation of electronic ‘transferrable records’ that serve the samefunction as promissory notes and documents of title.120  Just as holders ofpromissory notes and documents of title may assign their rights byphysically transferring the paper on which the instruments are written,121UETA and ESIGN allow holders of transferrable records to transfer theirrights by transferring control of their records.122  If electronic transferrablerecords become widely used, they could reduce the burden of keeping trackof promissory notes and documents of title, and provide added security. The key requirement for a transferrable record under UETA and ESIGNis that any copies of the record must be readily identifiable as copies andnot as the original.123  Otherwise, disputes might arise about who controls
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the original record. At present, techniques for creating records that satisfythis requirement remain under development. The drafters of UETA andESIGN, however, apparently wanted to establish legal rules in advance toprovide incentives for creating new systems.124 C. Other payment Devices For large payments, American businesses often employ letters of creditor funds transfers.125 Although UETA and ESIGN do not apply*681 tothese payment devices,126  the U.C.C. itself permits their use in electroniccommerce. U.C.C. Article 4A, which governs funds transfers, does notrequire a payment order initiating a funds transfer to have any particularform. Instead, it says that a payment order may be ‘transmitted orally,electronically, or in writing.’127  The revised version of U.C.C. Article 5,which governs letters of credit, requires the issuer of a letter of credit tocreate a ‘record.’128  The definition of record, however, includes electroni-cally stored data so long as it can be retrieved in a tangible form.129  Inaccordance with these rules, businesses and banks already use electronicmeans to create and transmit payment orders and letters of credit. Various businesses currently are developing new systems for makingpayments over the internet.130 These systems typically involve a combina-tion of credit card charges and online accounts. For the most part, privatecontracts govern the rights of the parties who use these systems. At somepoint, however, courts may need to develop common law rules forresolving some disputes not addressed by contract. In such instances, thecourts may choose either to analogize the new payment devices totraditional devices, or may attempt to find and apply general payment lawprinciples.131 
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V. Security of Electronic Commerce Companies doing business on the internet face security threats from twoprincipal sources: hackers and competitors.  Hackers generally seek todisrupt internet services, often for mischievous purposes rather thanmonetary gain. 132  Sometimes hackers gain access to a website’s computerfiles and make changes, seeking either to disable the website or toembarrass the proprietor. At other times, hackers take actions to overloadthe computers hosting the website, preventing legitimate users from gainingaccess. Existing laws make many types of hacking illegal.133  The federalCriminal Code, in particular, *682 has an extensive general provisionentitled ‘Fraud and related activity in connection with computers’ thatreaches most of this kind of conduct.134 Competitors generally do not attempt to disable a business’s website.Instead, they may seek to copy information from the website or to reach thebusiness’s customers.  They often accomplish these actions simply byaccessing the website just as ordinary internet users might.  They then useautomated means to obtain data contained within the website. To some extent, copyright laws and private contracts may prevent theappropriation of information by competitors.  For example, one businessmay not copy original photographs from another business’s website.  Inaddition, many websites require users to agree to terms and conditions thatprevent users from making commercial use of information contained in thewebsite. When copyright laws and private contracts have not provided protec-tion, the owners of some websites have attempted to bring actions againstunwelcome visitors under the tort of ‘trespass to chattels.’ Traditionally, aperson may commit this tort by impairing a chattel’s ‘condition, quality, or
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135 Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts § 218 . The official commentaryprovides this illustration: ‘A leaves his car parked near the corner. B, desiring toplay a joke upon A, pushes the car around the corner where it cannot be easily seenby A. A comes out for his car, and  fails to discover it for an hour. B is subject toliability for trespass to  A.’ Id. Illus. 4. 136 962  F. Supp. 1015, 1027-28 (S .D. Ohio 1997). 137 126  F. Supp.2d  238 , 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 138 100  F. Supp.2d  1058, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 139 2000 W L 1887522, *5 (C.D. Cal. 2000).140 Id. at *4. 141 SeeJulia Angwin, “E-Business: Has Growth of the Net Flattened?,” Wall St.J., July 16, 2001, at B1. 
value’ or by depriving the owner of ‘the use of the chattel for a substantialtime. ‘135 A few lower courts have granted preliminary injunctions on trespass tochattels claims.  In CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., the courtenjoined a business from sending unsolicited commercial email to thecustomers of an internet services provider.136  In Register.com, Inc. v.Verio, Inc., the court enjoined a competitor from using automated softwareprocesses to access and collect contact information from a competitor’sdatabase.137  Similarly, in eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., a court enjoineda competitor from obtaining and republishing information about on-lineauctions.138 Not all courts agree that these kinds of actions amount to trespass tochattels.  In Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., a court refused toenjoin a competitor from using automated means to extract informationabout concerts and other events from a competing website.*683139  Thecourt explained: ‘A basic element of trespass to chattels must be physicalharm to the chattel (not present here) or some obstruction of its basicfunction (in the court’s opinion not sufficiently shown here).’140  At present,too few courts have addressed the issue to make predictions about what thefuture will hold. VI. Access to Electronic Commerce Electronic commerce through the internet has become widely availablein the United States.  One recent study found that 57 percent of Americanhomes have access to the internet.141  In addition, another study found that
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more than 98 percent of all primary and secondary schools have internetaccess.142 Access to the internet, however, is not evenly distributed throughoutsociety.  Of families that make more than $100,000 a year, only about 7percent do not have internet access.143  By contrast, of families that makeless than $30,000, almost 60 percent do not have internet access.144  Whitesare more likely to have internet access than blacks or Hispanics; whitecollar employees more likely than blue collar workers; urban dwellers morelikely than rural residents; younger people more likely than older people;Republicans more likely than Democrats.145 In the context of internet commerce, this uneven distribution--oftencalled the ‘digital divide’--presents some reason for concern. To the extentthat banks and businesses reward customers who have internet access, somepercentage of the population may feel left behind. As a result, politiciansand others recently have called for government programs designed to bringinternet access to all.146 The proposals generally call for government funding of some sort toreduce the cost of internet access or to make it available for free at publiclocations.  Congress at present is considering various bills, sponsored byboth Republicans and Democrats, designed to address *684 the DigitalDivide.147  In addition, the states also are weighing legislative action.148 Despite great enthusiasm for digital divide legislation from somequarters, not much actually has happened.  Opponents of governmental
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solutions to the digital divide problem have made five important argumentsagainst the types of legislation proposed.  These arguments appear to haveat least enough support to delay or block most the proposed initiatives. First, any plan to have taxpayers provide goods and services to thepublic is socialism, a form of government that most Americans reject anddo not believe has proved successful.  The current chairman of the FederalCommunications Commission, Michael K. Powell, has voiced oppositionto measures to eliminate the digital divide on this ground.149 Second, computers and internet access have become so inexpensive thatthe government does not have to spend money on providing them to thepublic.  Used computers fully capable of surfing the internet cost less than$100. 150  In addition, consumers may obtain internet dial-up access for lessthan $5 a month (the equivalent of one package of cigarettes), if they arewilling to tolerate advertisements.151  These low prices suggest that manypeople who are not spending money on internet access simply have decidedthat they do not want it, not that they absolutely cannot afford it.152 Third, some calls for increased spending appear to come not from thepoor but from internet service providers.  The suspicion is that these firmssimply may want the government to provide them more business.  Forexample, AOL Time Warner, one of the largest internet*685 serviceproviders, recently funded the National Congress of American Indians’
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Digital Divide Task Force.153  This task force, not surprisingly, recentlysupported legislative measures to eliminate the digital divide.154 Fourth, some proponents of spending public money to eliminate thedigital divide have not sought to provide service to all the poor, or to justthe poor, but instead have targeted their aim toward getting votes.  Forexample, Democratic politicians from Western states want to give themoney to Indian communities (who tend to vote Democratic), rather thanto all residents of rural areas (who tend to vote Republican).155  Thisapproach makes their proposals less desirable to members of the opposingpolitical party. Fifth, to the extent that the government has additional money for thepoor, it should spend it on more urgent needs.  Critics advanced thisargument prominently when former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrichproposed giving tax credits to families who buy laptops for schoolchildren.156 VII. Conclusion This article has attempted to summarize some of the most importantAmerican legislative and judicial developments in the area of electroniccommerce.  The federal and state governments have constitutional powerto regulate most aspects of this commerce.  They have not needed toexercise much of this power because existing laws already apply to mostcommerce, whether electronic or conventional.  Most legislative efforts thathave occurred have sought not to regulate but merely to facilitate develop-ing commercial practices.  If this trend continues, electronic commerce maybecome even more convenient.
